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LANGUAGES OF A DIVIDED KINGDOM:
LOGIC AND LITERACY IN THE WRITING
CURRICULUM
JOEL

R. CORNWELL*

INTRODUCTION

One problem with slaying kings is that they never actually
die in the minds of their survivors. Indeed, as Freud postulated in
his theory of totemic authority, and as the Puritan regicides
discovered in their righteous interregnum, martyred patriarchs
rise up again to wield in death the advantage that they could not
muster in life. I confess that Professor Brewer's monarchical
metaphor stirs my own royalist sentiments. The metaphor is
compelling because, ironically, the restoration of deduction to the
law's gravitational center is a kind of romantic project. As a
remote heir of the Legal Realist revolution, the question for me is
whether the PunctuatedDeductive Equilibriummodel provides the
protection sufficient to a constitutional monarchy. Fortunately
(for my audience, at any rate), that is not precisely the question I
have been asked to address. Nevertheless, I ask indulgence to
work my way through the metaphor to elucidate my proper task.
Paying homage to deduction is the duty of a rational mind, for
deduction more than any mode of reasoning symbolizes the
protective order of logic against chaos. On the other hand,
symbols undermine their function if they work too well and draw
attention so emphatically to themselves that they obscure what
they purport to represent. The Legal Realists dethroned deduction
because they perceived it had turned tyrant. Given the dialectic
according to which revolutions invariably re-embody (with
cosmetic variations) the tyranny that was overthrown, it is good to
question whether the anti-deductivist interregnum has not
overreached its limits. The question is answerable only in
fragments, because here the metaphors of king and country break
down unless they are modified: law is a kingdom divided. Any
victory of Legal Realism was only in the intellectual provinces, an
area small and remote from the major population areas where
most of the industry is carried out. In Law's judicial heartland,
the post-deductivist regime has never been officially recognized,
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School.
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and the deposed king-or his heir, or perhaps a pretender-reigns
in exile. The situation is paradoxical because in the heartland no
one thinks of the king as being in exile. From their perspective, it
is only the rebellious academic guerrillas who will not
acknowledge the reality of who is in charge. My present concern is
not to decide which model represents the true government or
which faction is most out of touch with reality, but to respect the
integrity of each model in understanding how we speak law (for
one "practices" law only by speaking it) and how we should teach
people to speak law.
Whether or not deduction can be
determinative in legal thought, few people seem to be very good at
deduction. Whether experience or logic is more appropriately
characterized as bestowing "life" to law, none would argue that
both are necessary to sustain life, and few seem adept at
integrating human experience into legal discourse.
Legal education generally, and Legal Writing courses in
particular, have not done a good job of teaching either the
language of logic or the language of experience. Part of the
problem is that legal education begins and ends in the morass of
law as it is already written, in practice and in commentary upon
practice. Thus the study begins in a language already foreign in
the sense that it is a creole of ordinary speech, logical inference,
and specialized dialects of a social and professional class. It is an
artificial language, having the complexity of propositional calculus
without the precision. Professor Brewer's examples illustrate the
consequences of imprecision and the need to re-establish logical
integrity (not simply in the deductive mode) in the language we
teach. On the other hand, the voices of Legal Realists still remind
us that the failure adequately to incorporate into law's language
experiential aspects of human life undermines the goal of logical
integrity by covertly asserting premises that are empty,
misleading, or downright stupid. Logic is affected by a failure of
imagination and empathy as surely as imagination and empathy
are affected by invalid inference and deduction.
The present dilemma of legal education resembles in
significant aspects the dilemma of the liberal arts curriculum in
the mid-nineteenth century. In this sense, the Legal Realists were
to the study of law what the New Critics were to the study of
literature, both movements arising out of an historical matrix in
which the established language of an academic field had been
outstripped by evolving social realities. It was easier for the New
Critics because the language that needed supplanting was Latinnot the real kind of Latin that people could actually speak, but an
artificially preserved version that was foreign even to the few who
could write it well. Moreover, its artificial character robbed it of
vitality. The study of Latin was also the study of Rhetoric, but a
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cheap imitative version-not the logic and ethics of Aristotle.! In
Legal Writing courses, one way of establishing logical integrity to
our peculiar artificial language is to recover the strong aspects of
Aristotelian rhetoric so often neglected in a product-oriented
approach to writing. But this is not enough. The language of law
itself must be made less artificial.
As the strictures of the Latin curriculum fell aside, and the
study of literature was no longer yoked to outmoded oracular
models of rhetoric, vernacular literature emerged and blossomed
in the academy, and with it the new activity of literary criticism.
A similar remedy befits the present ill. Legal Writing courses
should not abandon rhetorical models, but expand the context
against which they are studied, measuring their integrity not only
in terms of effective technique, but also of moral value. In other
words, Legal Writing must contribute to a new interdisciplinary
study of law by cultivating literary imagination and incorporating
interpretive methods of literary criticism.
The skill of legal
argumentation is not accomplished merely by producing written
artifacts in a predictive or persuasive genre, but by standing
outside the genre in a critical posture that judges something akin
to aesthetic integrity as well as logical validity. My present
purpose is to delineate the possibility and encourage creative
pedagogy.
In Part I of this paper, I elaborate on the analogy between the
artificial academic version of "Learned Latin" (a term borrowed
from Walter Ong) and the artificial legal discourse of Stare Dictus
(a term borrowed from Herman Oliphant). In Part II, I trace
means of curtailing the artificial character of the discourse, first,
through identifying distinctive devices in the language as given by
courts (a traditional approach, which I term "weak" rhetoric);
second, through translating the given language into informal
propositions and identifying the psychological framework which
gives the propositions compelling force (a variation of an
1. Aristotle approached rhetoric as a combination of logic and ethics; the
point of the discipline is to persuade people to act in accordance with what is
good. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 1.2 §§ 1356a-56b; 1.4 § 1359b; 1.6 (George A.
Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991). See also ALBERT R. JONSEN &
STEPHEN TOULMIN,

THE

ABUSE OF

CASUISTRY

63-74

(1988)

(discussing

Aristotle's notion of moral judgment as phronesis ("prudence" or "practical
wisdom") as opposed to episteme ("science" or "knowledge"), placing moral
deliberation properly within the scope of rhetoric). For a detailed analysis of
the sense in which Aristotelian rhetoric both is and is not morally neutral, see
Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Is There an Ethical Dimension of Aristotelian
Rhetoric, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC 116-41 (Amelie Oksenberg

Rorty ed. 1996) (explaining how the ethical dimension of Aristotelian rhetoric
is not dependent on the moral character of the rhetorician, but on "certain
facts about human seeing-the way human beings are related to truth," such
that what is good and true will be inherently more convincing than what is
not).
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Aristotelian identification of enthymemes, which I term "strong"
rhetoric); and third, through approaching judicial opinions as a
literary genre subject to formal aesthetic categories critically
applied to vernacular genres (a kind of "literary criticism"
resembling the approach of the New Critics). This third approach,
presently in seminal manifestations, provides ample promise for a
philosophical approach to the study of law.
I.

EXPERIENCING LAW AS A FOREIGN LANGUAGE

A. The Curriculumof "LearnedLatin"
In the America of the mid-nineteenth century, there were no
college English majors, no substantial courses in American
literature, and no literary criticism. The burgeoning public
schools were of course teaching English and American literature to
the children of merchants and laborers, but the finer secondary
schools, like the colleges and universities, eschewed the vernacular
in favor of Latin and Greek, just as the humanists had done in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.2 Certainly, this was a
strange situation since even in the fifteenth-century Latin was
hardly spoken in any public forum except for the Mass, and this
hardly counted for schoolboys even in Catholic countries. (Greek,
of course, was even more obscure, and 3so Latin, by its comparative
relevance, dominated the curriculum.)
As one might predict, boys who were coerced into learning a
language that they would never use outside of school did not learn
it very well.4 But this only caused educators to devote more
resources to its instruction, pushing the subject higher into the
curriculum, so that Latin classes could not be avoided from
elementary school through college.' Yet, despite the fact that
Latin was the language of learning, the number of books published
in Latin steadily declined from the seventeenth century through
the nineteenth. The language that had once been the prerequisite
for all learning now needed justification, and there was little to be
conjured up. The addition of new and discrete areas of study,
particularly in the sciences, put increased pressure on a loaded
down curriculum.6
As Walter Ong points out, there are many reasons why Latin
2. Walter J. Ong, The Vernacular Matrix of the New Criticism, in THE
BARBARIAN WITHIN 177 (1962) [hereinafter The VernacularMatrix].
3. Id. at 180.
4. The medieval rhetorician Peter Ramus, writing in 1562, complained
that of the roughly one thousand students who attended lectures at the
University of Paris, barely two hundred were fluent enough in Latin to
understand them. Id. at 191.

5. Id. at 189-91.
6. Id. at 192-93.
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waned, but principal among them was the contrived character of
the language Latin had become. 7 The "Learned Latin" of the
humanist tradition was rigid and incapable of growth. Totally
dependent upon the academic community for its very existence, it
could not, like other languages, adapt to fit the psychological needs
of its speakers-more precisely, of its writers, since in function
there were no speakers. Indeed, that is the point. Latin was not a
"dead" language in the sense that it could not add to its
vocabulary-scholars coined new terms with regularity-but it
was, in Ong's phrase, "an artificially preserved language,
chirographically (and in part typographically) controlled."' The
literary study that young men encountered in school was also
artificial in the sense that it was dominated by rhetorical models
largely incapable of expressing the familiar sensibilities of life as it
was actually experienced.
As Ong continues:
This Latin orientation of formal literary training gave to all
literature a curiously public and formal, although not necessarily an
unemotional cast. This was because Latin was no longer a
vernacular language. The vernacular enters into areas of life where
other languages cannot enter-the family, intimate personal
relationships, and, most of all, the depths of the individual
consciousness initially opened and permanently occupied by the
terms and the concomitant concepts through which the individual
first becomes conscious of his own existence as he learns to think
and talk. Latin could be somewhat intimate in the letters of
Erasmus or More, but it was never a family language. Humanists
actually advocated-and practiced-the expulsion of young boys
from their families at around the age of seven so that they would be
free of corrupting vernacular influences, particularly from
womenfolk, including the child's own mother. For even the
humanists' wives did not coo to their children in Ciceronian Latinor in any Latin at all. No one ever entered into his first awareness
of himself and the world around him through its ministrations.
Latin was foreign to absolutely all of those who after classical times
for well over a thousand years read and spoke and wrote it so well,
but as a learned tongue. 9

7. The Vernacular Matrix, supra note 2, at 193-98. Father Ong estimates

that in the British Isles during the sixteenth century, no more than ten
percent of those who studied Latin in school did any extended writing in Latin
as adults. Id. at 189. By the nineteenth century, the figure drops to one half
of one percent.

Id. at 190.

Anthony Trollope, writing of his education at

Harrow, which he left in 1834 at the age of nineteen, complained that "no
attempt had been made to teach us anything but Latin and Greek ....Those
were twelve years of tuition in which I do not remember that I ever knew a
lesson." Walter J. Ong, Latin and the Social Fabric, in THE BARBARIAN
WITHIN, supra note 2, at 206-08 (quoting Trollope's autobiography).
8. The VernacularMatrix, supra note 2, at 195.
9. Id. at 181. See also Latin and the Social Fabric,supra note 7, at 211-16
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If the foreign quality of their literary language"° was felt by
those who read and wrote Latin well, the effect was all the more
acute for others-the vast majority-who read and wrote it
poorly." There could be no literary criticism as we think of it
because there was practically no literature as we think of it.
Literary study consisted of formulaic rhetoric. Unlike the critical
study of literature, which self-consciously draws upon a broad
range of intellectual, emotional, and psychological categories to
evaluate a work in a given context, the ordinary approach of
rhetoric is inherently unreflective. The mastery of rhetoric is
largely a matter of imitation. Texts and teachers focus reflexively
on how to exert influence, neglecting or even disdaining questions
pertaining to that for the sake of which influence is exerted. To a
person who is not adept in the language, and to whom the words
and phrases in the most benign context are experienced as
external rather than as the essence of self and thought, the
temptation to copy language without thinking has all the force of
animal instinct. Copying is all people can do when they do not
know what they are doing. Unfortunately, rote imitation, when it
works, encourages people not to care that they do not know what
they are doing.
There were of course some talented pupils who benefited from
the rhetoric-centered curriculum, and who enhanced vernacular
literature as a result. But students of the caliber of Shakespeare
or Jonson are exceptional in any educational milieu. To the degree
that the literature of Learned Latin worked to enhance the
vernacular through the skillful incorporation of classical forms, it
more surely hastened its own demise. Still, however widely
(connecting the culture of the "particularly male world of Latin-and-formalschooling" with puberty rites in tribal societies).
10. The fact that Learned Latin preserved the vestiges of oral culture
through classical rhetoric is paradoxical when one considers that Learned
Latin (as opposed to earlier vernacular Latin) could exist only because human
consciousness had been transformed by writing:
Learned Latin was a striking exemplification of the power of writing for
isolating discourse and of the unparalleled productivity of such isolation.
Writing... serves to separate and distance the knower and the known

and thus to establish objectivity ....

Learned Latin effects even greater

objectivity by establishing knowledge in a medium insulated from the

emotion-charged depths of one's mother tongue,
interference

thus reducing

from the human lifeworld and making possible

the

exquisitely abstract world of medieval scholasticism and of the new
mathematical modern science which followed on the scholastic
experience. Without Learned Latin, it appears that modern science
would have got under way with greater difficulty, if it had got under
way at all. Modern science grew in Latin soil, for philosophers and
scientists through the time of Sir Isaac Newton commonly both wrote
and did their abstract thinking in Latin.
WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY 113-14 (1982).
11. See generally supra notes 4 and 7.
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Shakespeare was read in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, his plays would not routinely be studied in colleges until
the nineteenth century was well under way. It was not until 1876
that Harvard, in the vanguard of American education, appointed
James Child as its first professor of English. But evolutionary
trajectories have their peculiar dynamism. By the time T. S. Eliot
entered Harvard in 1906, an entire generation was receiving
thorough instruction in English literature. 2
In the end, what stands out is not the inordinate time that
the Latin curriculum was preserved beyond its usefulness so much
as the inevitability of its demise and the radical shift of attention
that the study of vernacular literature necessarily evoked.
Modern literary criticism could not not exist so long as the
academic model of literary study employed words that could not
touch the deeper emotive sensibilities of human consciousness.
Latin was a dead language not because it was not used, but
because it was not used in the times, places, and circumstances
that mattered to people; its forms could not fit the contexts which
sustain the psychological complexes which we designate with the
short-hand term "meaning." In a word, Latin had become too
abstract. Untold years of cultivation had rendered it unsuitable to
the naturally wild appetites of the human heart. A language that
can be spoken only by rote is a language that cannot speak back,
even if the speaker is Cicero, Quintilian, or Thomas More.
Once the Latin curriculum was replaced by literature in an
indigenous language, modern literary criticism could not exist.
Now the text could speak back, for its language, whatever the
source, bore meaning, to some degree or another, according to
some terms or others. Now the text contained words that the
reader necessarily employed in spinning her own narrative
identity, her own sense of self. The act of reading was more than
an encounter with words as things, but a participation of feeling,
just as surely as if the reader participated, however unwittingly,
by the author's physical touch. Like it or not, the text was alive
because it was written in a living language, and so the text was
the center of attention. It could be no other way. The study of
literature could no longer exist essentially as imitation for the
sake of sounding good to people in a language that neither
speakers nor hearers could feel meant very much. Within little
more than a generation, the study of literature had evolved in a

12. The VernacularMatrix, supra note 2, at 204. English literature became

a common subject of graduate study in America, and undergraduate study at
Oxford and Cambridge, only after the First World War. ORALITY AND
LITERACY, supra note 10, at 163.

The Harvard curriculum experienced by

Eliot stood in sharp contrast to the Latin based curriculum studied by Ezra
Pound at the University of Pennsylvania. The VernacularMatrix, supra note
2, at 204.
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radical way.
Now imagine the same thing happening in Legal Writing
courses.
B. The Curriculum of Stare Dictus
While our own legal documents are not written in Latin, we
all share the sentiment that, given their poor craftsmanship, many
of them might as well be. There is more to this jocular observance
than one might suspect, and the resemblance of law to a foreign
language is not solely the product of bad writing. Anyone who has
taught Legal Writing, or anyone whose student memories remain
vivid, will by this point have perceived some uncanny similarities
between the antiquated curriculum of Learned Latin and the
contemporary law school curriculum, especially Legal Writing
pedagogy. Both originated in oral cultures in which public
Accordingly, both
speaking was emphasized over writing.
maintained instructional models based on rhetoric in the classical
sense, emphasizing speech over writing long after the cultural
consciousness has it the other way around. The residual effects of
this commitment to oratory are often subtle, but plain enough to
have shaped the agenda of law professors from Langdell to the
present day. The extent to which the educational agenda has also
been shaped by the expectations of attorneys and judges is
debatable, since attorneys and judges are also products of the
agenda. But whatever the measure of reciprocal influence, Legal
Writing courses arise in a legal community that has maintained
strong vestigial roots to an oral culture.
Like the old Latin literary study, Legal Writing courses
minimize aesthetic considerations, focusing almost exclusively on
clear diction and persuasive structure. Insofar as one thinks
about the "content" of legal literature, it is as amorphous mental
stuff to be transliterated into simple declarative sentences that
support assertions ordered according to logical force and weight of
authority. Legal Writing pedagogy also tends to be imitative
rather than creative, and aggregative rather than analytic. The
way to write well, students are taught, is to follow established
models for briefs, memoranda, and examinations. Often these
models develop into formulaic anagrams (IRAC, CRAC, CREAC),
another vestige of oral cultures. Students are taught that the
strength of a legal assertion lies in its familiarity; original ideas
All legal
are by nature idiosyncratic and untrustworthy.
arguments are arguments from authority. The number of cases
saying the same thing counts more than the quality of any given
idea, and ideas without substantial expression in headnotes are
relegated to the inferior species of argument called "policy." The
craft of legal research is thus taught as a kind of puzzle in which
the researcher finds and fits the rule pieces into an aggregate
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picture which is law, and which, like a picture puzzle or a
mathematics problem, has a definitive solution waiting in
potentiality.
Like the old Latin rhetoric, this classic mode of Legal Writing
is practical and unambiguous in its taxonomies and devices.
Rhetorical principles are comparatively easy to memorize, and, for
a number of purposes, they work. If, however, one wishes to
empower a student with any skill greater than can fit into a
prefabricated bag of tricks, the approach is not very useful.
Because rhetorical tropes are mastered primarily through
imitation, traditional Legal Writing courses, like their Latin
predecessors, are prone to be pedantic, repetitious, and
unreflective. Legal rhetoric, like Latin rhetoric, can be boring.
Moreover, if the rhetorician thinks too much, he undermines his
mastery of the devices. A cultivated capacity for self-criticism is a
definite hindrance to the public performer, who is the archetypal
rhetorician. As Plato so adeptly demonstrated, this unreflective
character of all rhetoric makes it dangerous when its devices
empower the wrong persons. 3 People who do not have to think
about what they are saying are all the more likely to believe what
they say.
Writers are not public orators, and reflection ordinarily works
to the writer's advantage. But the rhetorical mode of instruction
was conceived in a culture primarily oral, and vestiges of orality
are necessarily grafted onto any adaptation of rhetoric to a literate
mode. The disjunction is reinforced by the strong oral component
that legal discourse cannot discard, notwithstanding the fact that
law has long been a language far more heavily weighted toward
the written word. However much the written rule is exalted by
formal study and the genres of the appellate process (written
briefs and published judicial opinions), the greater part of legal
discourse-e.g., trials, motion hearings, negotiations-remains
spoken, not written. In a sense, the respective transactions of trial
and appellate advocacy represent a duality between the primary
oral culture of law's origin and the secondary literate culture into
which all disciplines have been irresistibly drawn by technological
advances. Surely this is a matter for further study. But one effect
is clear: in the shift to the increased linear consciousness that
necessarily attended the evolution from orality to literacy, the
character of legal language changed. It increasingly took the
character of an artificial language, like Learned Latin, well
adapted to categorical thinking, and ill adapted to life as it is lived
by most people in most circumstances.

13. See, e.g., Plato, Gorgias, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 455-65e (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Lane Cooper et al. trans., Princeton
University Press 1961).
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The systematic publication of the written judicial opinion, a14
practice not commonplace until the end of the eighteenth century,
symbolized the final dominance of the literate over the oral, and
the emerging dominance of artificial language over natural
language in legal discourse. The invention of printing in the
fifteenth century had begun the process that would change in a
fundamental way not only the customs and procedures of legal
transactions, but the level of abstraction of the language in which
lawyers think. In oral cultures, ritualized language that must be
remembered across generations is marked by a kind of "lyric flow,"
which allows for flexibility in narration" and, in the larger
temporal context, the kind of creative memory that suits itself to
the exigencies of the present, confident in its authority."6 In fact,
the radical inaccuracy of human memory, collective and
individual, was revealed only with the advent of written
documentation. The word once written is as stone; it alone
endures beyond its creator, unlike the oral word, which is
vanished even as it is finished. The written word always bespeaks
inflexibility, the printed word even more.
Printing generally, and the printed judicial opinion in
particular, made law less flexible and more abstract-another
twin phenomenon, since, ironically, it is only at a higher level of
14. PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 37 (1999).
15. Relying on the work of Milman Parry, Ong notes that a bard reciting
the Homeric epics would have had at his disposal thousands of metrical
formulas that could be fitted to the needs of the bard's and his audience in any
one telling of the story. ORALITY AND LITERACY, supra note 10, at 58-59.
16. See Id. at 46-49. This is the "homeostatic" quality of oral cultures.
Studies of oral cultures in Nigeria and Ghana reported in the 1960's indicated
significant discrepancies between the genealogies as they were carefully
recorded by the British and as they were recounted by oral genealogists and
used by the people in their judicial actions. Id. This is not because oral
memorization is inherently faulty, but because, in an oral culture, it is natural
to account for the shifting social and political structures over forty or fifty
years by conforming language to its more immediate contexts. The notion that
there is a past state of affairs logically preceding words which represent them
operates only when writing structures the human consciousness to view words
as things. Only a word grasped as a thing apart from consciousness can have
a fixed meaning, a definition. In an oral culture, on the other hand,
Words acquire their meanings only from their always insistent actual
habitat, which is not, as in a dictionary, simply other words, but
includes also gestures, vocal inflections, facial expression, and the entire
human, existential setting in which the real, spoken word always occurs.
Word meanings come continuously out of the present, though past
meanings of course have shaped the present meaning in many and
varied ways, no longer recognized ....
When generations pass and the object or institution referred to by the
archaic word is no longer part of present, lived experience, though the
word has been retained, its meaning is commonly altered or simply
vanishes.
Id. at 47.
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abstraction that written language regains some flexibility. In
effect, this is the phenomenon Herman Oliphant criticized as the
7
movement from stare decisis to stare dictus.'
Noting the great
number of writs and forms of action at common law, Oliphant
pointed out the significant effect that, for any one form of action,
there was comparatively little precedent. This meant that the
judge had comparatively greater freedom to formulate an
operative principle by which the cases could be analogized, i.e., the
necessary level of abstraction was low and the significance of the
facts of the case at hand was high. 8 The facts tended to frame the
principle necessary for a consistent decision. This was stare
decisis. Of course all of this changed in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries:
Reduction in the number of actions and pleas and the broadening of
those that remained, with no substituting machinery of
classification, resulted in wider and wider groupings of multiform
states of fact ....
A wave of continental learning swept over England, leaving a thick
deposit of its obscurant abstractions, and much of it still remains.
When the history of this period is fully written, we may find that the
breakdown of procedure was partly an effect as well as a cause of
this orgy of overgeneralization [sic].19
Whether increased abstraction was the proximate result of
printing, German idealism, or some other historical peculiarity, it
would seem that the mode of legal analysis dominant when the
West Company began publishing its regional reporters in the
1880's was fundamentally different than that which prevailed in
the sixteenth century. Oliphant is correct that, facing the plethora
of published case law, the contemporary lawyer imposes order by
giving a primacy to principle, hunting from the outset for the
abstraction that will tie together a mass of cases that have
practically nothing in common other than a few judicial phrases.
This is stare dictus, the misplaced emphasis on the words and
phrases of judicial opinions at the expense of the actions taken by
courts in light of the specific fact patterns which a court might or
might not acknowledge as a factor in its decision.
However concretely lawyers and judges might speak in
conversation with one another, when they speak in briefs or
judicial opinions, that is, when they are writing the language that
is law, they speak more abstractly.
The grammar favors
conceptualization. It disfavors the individual voice. Like the
venerable Learned Latin, it is a language in which vocabulary
increases, but in ways that bring the discourse no closer to lived
17. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 72 (1928).
18. Id. at 73-74.
19. Id. at 74.
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human experience. Like pedantic Latin, stare dictus language is
not natural to any speaker. People who learn it, even the
comparatively few who learn it quite well, feel as if it is foreign.
Those who do not learn the language well resort to the functional
equivalent of phrase books, a practice reinforced by rhetorical
modes of teaching. Study of the language is an occasion for
attenuated initiation ritual, as was the study of Latin, and, as
with Latin, functional mastery bestows the reward of fraternity.
Like Latin, stare dictus language has been preserved, and its
vocabulary shaped, by an elite social and economic class. Like
Latin, it has been a language from which women traditionally
have been excluded, and so it has lacked a feminine voice. And for
all of these reasons, the language in which we write law is not
working very well. One might say that it is working about as well
as Latin was working in the nineteenth century when it was still
the language of literature.
Now imagine replacing stare dictus language with a
vernacular filled with words, voices, moods, and nuances
encompassing a richer dimension of the human experience.'

20. When I speak of experiencing law as a vernacular language, I am not
speaking of familiarity as such, for artificial languages can become familiar.
The essence of a vernacular language is its breadth-in Father Ong's words,
its capacity to enter "the depths of the individual consciousness initially
opened and permanently occupied by the terms [of the language]." The
Vernacular Matrix, supra note 2, at 181. A vernacular legal discourse, then,

presupposes an interdisciplinary network, but remains distinctly "literary" in
the sense that no single discipline can establish privileged technical or
ideological concepts. In other words, the artificial language of stare dictus
ought not be replaced by an artificial language of Anthropology, Feminism,

Critical Race Theory, Philosophy, or any other field. "Literature" is de facto
the academic discipline most amenable to a vernacular experience because

literature embraces the most inclusive forms of expression. For this reason, it
has been difficult for advocates of a "Law and Literature" movement to state
an operative premise. The following attempt seems effective, and it also
captures the sense of a "vernacular" legal discourse as I employ the term:
This premise is that "law is best regarded not as a kind of social science

but as one of the humanities."

Like literature, law is a form of

"constitutive rhetoric," a communal activity through which speakers and
writers establish "comprehensible relations and shared meanings." So
understood, law is not merely a compendium of rules or an authoritative

institution but "a set of speakers, roles, topics, and occasions for speech."
Lawyers are more like artists than policy analysts or partisan
advocates, in that their work weaves together the materials of culture in
new and beautiful designs.
Jeffrey Malkan, Law on a Darkling Plain, 101 HARV. L. REV. 702, 707 (1988)
(reviewing JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC

AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985)) (quotations from the reviewed text).
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II.

TEACHING LAW AS A VERNACULAR LANGUAGE

A. The Curriculum of Weak Rhetoric
The analogy between the present mode of teaching Legal
Writing and the rhetorical mode of teaching Latin literature
illustrates a problem that is two-fold. First, we are confronted
with teaching in an artificial language, experienced as "foreign" by
first-year students, and rightly so, since the medium circumscribes
human relations, emotions, and the "individual depth of
consciousness" thus engendered. Second, we have developed bad
habits of teaching this language in a way that, despite our
pretensions, emphasizes imitation over analytic creativity, and so
contributes to the obscure character of the language. In teaching
rhetorical tropes, asking only perfunctory questions about why
these tricks work, and not asking any questions about the moral
fiber of a legal system so highly dependent on form over substance,
we create the monster we would slay, and condemn ourselves in
hypocrisy. At the same time, the monster also creates us, as we
are seduced further into formulaic abstraction so that we might
solve problems that are in large measure the consequence of our
prior solutions.
Here is an example drawn fresh from the rough and tumble
world of the classroom. At John Marshall, as at many other
schools, our first semester students are initiated into Legal
Writing by a closed memorandum problem. One of the issues in
the problem this fall was whether a law degree, gained partly by
the financial support of the lawyer's spouse, could be marital
property. In one of the cases, O'Brien v. O'Brien,2' the New York
Court of Appeals concluded that a degree was marital property. 2
Why? Because the dissolution statute said that marital property
was "all property acquired by either or both spouses during the
marriage... regardless of the form in which title is held."8 A
second case in the memorandum corpus, Hoak v. Hoak, 4 decided
by the Supreme Court of West Virginia, held otherwise.2' The
Hoak court did not focus on the words of the state's dissolution
statute" (which did not differ markedly from New York's), but
21. 489 N.E.2d 712, (N.Y. 1985).

22. Id. at 713.
23. Id. at 715 (citing Domestic Relations Law § 236[B] [1] [c](emphasis by
the court)). The court also emphasized a different section of the statute,
requiring the court to consider in distribution contributions or equitable
claims "to the career or careerpotential of the other party." Id. at 715-16 (citing
Domestic Relations Law § 236[B] [5] [D] [6], [9] (emphasis by the court)).
24. 370 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988).
25. Id. at 477.
26. The pertinent section of the West Virginia Code cited by the court
defined "marital property," in part, as "[aill property and earnings acquired by
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instead concentrated on the item in dispute, and announced that
all but one jurisdiction that had considered the matter had
concluded that an academic degree or professional license could
not be marital property.27 Here is why:
An educational degree... is simply not encompassed even by the
broad views of the concept of "property." It does not have an
exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open
market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on the death of
the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold,
transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a
cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere
expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that
may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our
view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of
that term.28
But the problem goes deeper than empirical verification. In
addition, the academic degree or professional license would be
difficult to value, and, more importantly, "characterizing spousal
contributions as an investment in each other as human assets
demeans the concept of marriage."29 To this argument, we will
return later. For the moment, let us stay with what appears to be
the more straightforward question of whether the degree is
property. What teaching strategy makes sense of these conflicting
authorities? First, one must attempt to understand the respective
courts' reasoning on their own terms, and to identify a strategy
based on a close reading of each case.
The rule-based reasoning employed in the first case implicitly
appeals to the superiority of legislative acts over judicial opinions.
Strategy: Emphasize adjectives of inclusion (e.g., all) within the
statutory text, as well as adverbial clauses (e.g., regardless of the
form) that designate or connote inclusion, implying that a question
of definition is illusory. The law degree is property because, as the
O'Brien court proclaimed, "The words [of the statute] mean exactly
what they say."30
The rule-based reasoning employed in the second case
implicitly appeals to the shared empirical sensibilities underlying
both statutes and case law. Counter-strategy:Focus attention on
uncontested examples authoritatively fitting the statutory
either spouse during a marriage, including every valuable right and interest,

tangible or intangible, real or personal, regardless of the form of ownership,
whether legal or beneficial[.]" Id. at 475 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e)
(1986)).
27. Id. at 475.
28. Id. at 475-76 (quoting In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo.

1978)).
29. Id. at 476.
30. 489 N.E.2d at 716.
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definition, extrapolate characteristics common- to many of the
examples, and assert the absence of these characteristics in the
critical item. The law degree cannot be marital property because,
as the Hoak court concluded, "it has none of the attributes of
property in the usual sense of that term.""' (The "usual sense" of
the term is of course whatever sense one creates by the choice of
examples.)
To this point, the teaching strategy seems sound. Two
different rhetorical approaches have been identified. Two different
tricks can now be stashed in the proverbial bag. The problem is
that it seems so sound that there is a natural temptation to stop
here. Having enabled the student to understand the judicial
rationales and employ them in a second order (i.e., predictive)
analysis, the professor wants to believe that she has done her job.
She has not. The student has learned to imitate empty rhetoric.
Nothing more. Neither student nor professor has been empowered
in the sense befitting legal education without some more thorough
analysis of how these tricks work.
Without some further
knowledge of the mechanisms that make the tricks compelling,
they can only be applied haphazardly, as orators employ various
catchy phrases in the hope that some of them will stick with their
audiences.
B. The Curriculumof Strong Rhetoric
Logical fallacies create illusion. While logical integrity does
not invariably dispel illusion, it is always a good start. In our
marital property example, each court comes to its conclusion by
begging the question, 2 each court presupposing identities that it
purports to verify empirically. The O'Brien court's assertion that
the statute includes an academic degree as property because the
statute mandates a court to distribute "all property" is circular on
its face; the statute's admonition that the court consider
contributions by one spouse to the "career or career potential"
when dividing the property does not specify any particular
valuation strategy, or dictate that any one strategy is appropriate

31. 370 S.E.2d at 476.
32. Rhetoric texts traditionally employ classifications of "informal" logic,
modeled after Aristotle's examples of fallacious enthymemes. ARISTOTLE,
supra note 1, at 2.24. "Informal" fallacies occur in ordinary language, as
opposed to "formal" fallacies, which are expressed in more precise symbolic
form. "Begging the Question" (Petitio Principii) is a classic fallacy of
presumption. IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 18687 (10th ed. 1998). See generally id. at 160-213 (Chapter 6, "Fallacies"). In
writing courses, I prefer an "informal" approach to logic because of its
tradition within Aristotelian rhetoric, and because-as anyone who teaches

future interests can attest-many students fall into a kind of "math anxiety"
when they confront even quasi-symbolic formulas.
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for all contributions.33 If anything is clear from the words, it would
seem clear that there is no mandate to value an academic degree
as a tangible asset. If there is such a mandate in the statute's
words, the meaning is only apparent if one accepts an array of
meanings in words and phrases outside the statutory text, i.e., a
context of aspirations and purposes against which the statutory
terms stand,3 4 a value-laden background and lighting which
emphasize the measurable income-enhancing angle over the
ethereal mental achievement angle. If the court is aware of this
larger context, we are told nothing about it. To assert that an
academic degree is marital property because the statute means
what it says is to say simply that a medical degree is property
because it is property.
The Hoak court's assertion that an entity cannot be property
unless it has certain attributes assumes that the attributes are
logically precedent to the concept they define-that an exchange
value, for example, is not a consequence of courts bestowing a
"property" right, but a substantial characteristic that compels
recognition that an entity already is "property," as opposed to
something of an inferior ontological status. Moreover, the failure
of an academic degree to fit the designations is fatal only by
reference to an unarticulated series of relationships by which
entities are identified on the basis of comparative strengths and
weaknesses across the elemental field. In other words, not every
characteristic the Hoak court lists can be predicated on everything
that courts have spoken of as property.35 Social Security benefits
33. For pedagogical purposes, we might thus recast the argument in a
syllogistic form: (P1) Marital property includes property in all forms; (P2) In
distributing marital property, courts must consider the career or career
potential of the parties; Therefore, courts must consider a medical degree as a
form of marital property. The error might be characterized as a presumptive
fallacy of accident, improperly applying a general category (property) to an
unrelated item (career potential) by inferring that a function (distribution) is a
specific form of its antecedent subject (property). COPI & COHEN, supra note
32, at 187-89.
34. That is, a network of silent intervening propositions, which are in the
nature of incomplete arguments. Aristotle called these enthymemes. Although

Aristotle refers to an enthymeme as a sort of syllogism, ARISTOTLE, supra note
1, at 1.2 § 1356b, and logicians subsequently employed the term generically to
refer to any kind of abbreviated syllogism, an enthymeme is more precisely
viewed as a kind of demonstrative likelihood, subject to refutation and

confirmation by a preponderance of evidence rather than by validity in a
strictly deductive mode.

M. F. Burnyeat, Enthymeme: Aristotle on the

Rationality of Rhetoric, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC, supra note 1, at
88, 90-91, 105-10. In other words, an enthymeme does not live or die by logic
alone, but by its correspondence to lived experience.
35. For pedagogical purposes, we might thus recast the argument in a
syllogistic form: (P1) A law degree does not possess attributes shared by many

[but not all] items designated as property; (P2) A law degree possess attributes
not shared by many [but not all] items designated as property; Therefore, a
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and vested pension rights are personal to the holder and not
transferable.
Reversionary interests such as possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry could not be alienated or devised at
common law, and they cannot in some states today. And while an
academic degree cannot be attained solely by the expenditure of
money, the matriculation that is the degree's precondition is
routinely purchased. If schools do not sell diplomas, they at least
sell matriculation. What, then, are the unifying principles by
which some entities but not others, for some purposes but not
others, are designated as property? If the court knows, it is not
saying. To assert that an academic degree is not property because
it does not possess sufficient attributes of property is to say simply
that a law degree is what it is because it is not what it is not. 6
The student is thus empowered by grasping the mechanics of
the rhetorical illusions that she will fit in the bag. The first level
analysis is empowering because it reveals that the legal issue,
rather than being a fixed entity objectively verifiable, is a kind of
metaphor. Metaphors open possibilities. One can employ the
metaphor of "text," presenting a picture of plain words standing
out as things in a chaotic jumble of blurred stuff that (as in a
dream) will not quite form readable letters, or one can employ a
metaphor of "property," presenting a picture of houses, land,
automobiles, animals and multiple things standing alongside of a
vaporous coalescence (the law degree) that will not quite
materialize into the "real" world. The second level analysis is
empowering because it demonstrates the formal means by which
the metaphorical devices appear compelling, providing the student
with a sense of mastery over the trope. Again, a professor could
end the analysis at this level and reasonably believe that she has
imparted the "skills" of these devices by demonstrating their broad
law degree is not property. The court might here stand accused of an
ambiguous fallacy of composition, reasoning that since many specific members
of a collection possess certain attributes, each and every member of the
collection must either possess those attributes or not possess certain other
attributes shared by many specific members of a contrary class. See CoPI &
COHEN, supra note 32, at 197-99. The ambiguity lies in the fact that the
certain attributes (the presence and absence of which define property in the

.ordinary" sense), in this context, are not certain at all. Id.
36. Cf Plato, Meno 70-72d, in THE GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 28-31 (Eric
H. Warmington & Philip G. Rouse eds., & W.D.H. Rouse trans., New American

Library, Inc. 1956). Believing that he has set forth a definition of virtue, Meno
is made aware that he has only espoused specific examples. Id. That which is
common to all instances-the essential nature of virtue-has eluded him. Id.
(In retrospect, I wish I had used the opening sections of the Meno when
working through the cases in class. Selected passages from philosophical texts
can help students realize that the problems in the cases before them are not
peculiar to law or expressible only in a legal vocabulary. A modest dose of

Plato also reveals how unfair to Socrates is our characterization of the
traditional law professor's classroom method).
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structure and effective employment. But if the compelling force of
the metaphors is to be judged in a particular application-and
predicting an outcome is, after all, the point of the objective
memorandum of law-there are further questions to be addressed.
The potential strength of a metaphor can only be understood
against the context in which it is employed, the aforementioned
array of meanings already in place, the interpersonal aspirations
and purposes against which the metaphors are staged.
Because the judicial reasoning in O'Brien and Hoak makes
sense only if one fills in a number of blanks, the first step in a
realistic analysis of these cases is to consider that which the courts
have not spoken, but assumed. The next order of business is to
examine why these assumptions operate so well, i.e., why the
reader has the initial tendency to assume them also, and thus has
to stand away from the text and think awhile in order to realize
the extent of what is missing. These tacit premises constitute
what Aristotle called enthymemes, syllogisms that depend on silent
ideas that repel conscious reflection like a stealth aircraft repels
radar waves. For Aristotle, the art of persuasion was essentially a
skill of identifying the assumptions that evade critical analysis
because they are so embedded in our ordinary attitudes. The kind
of practical psychology that seeks to identify enthymematic force
in arguments is in the best tradition of rhetoric, a tradition that
appears largely to have been lost in classrooms when Aristotle was
lost to the barbarian invasions.
Enthymematic analysis
necessarily extends beyond a cataloging of tropes. Aristotle saw
rhetoric not only as an exercise in logic, but as a manifestation of
ethics. 7 So these critical, unspoken modes of perception that win
arguments take logic out of the dispassionate realm.
The Legal Realists were just as serious about the ethical
content of purportedly dispassionate judicial reasoning. There is
no single formula for a realistic critique of case law, but if one
strives to think enthymematically, one begins with the obvious.
Regarding the issue of whether a professional degree is "property,"
one might observe that this line of cases almost invariably involves
women seeking compensation from men, and that men are almost
invariably deciding the cases. One might then wonder whether
the majority of judges (and readers) identify more readily with the
husbands who would be forced to pay significant sums, sometimes
unjustly. Attempting to get behind this attitude, one might sense
that this fear of injustice is fueled by a perception that previous
judicial expansions of the metaphor of marital property, e.g., to
include pension benefits, have been subsequently applied to
situations unintended by the architects of expansion.
(For
example, the cases initially establishing the rights of divorced
37. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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spouses to pension benefits involved older women, unskilled in the
labor market, abandoned by their husbands, while such claims
now are routinely made by younger professional spouses of both
genders.) In addition, one might endeavor to understand the
attitudes of the judicial minority by positing a more proximate
identification with the women seeking compensation.
The
identification could be seen against a complex of potential factors:
sensitivity to politically correct postures; personal experience
(perhaps quantifiable) generating identification with persons
having borne disproportionate sacrifice in relationships; personal
experience (decidedly non-quantifiable) engendering greater trust
in authority (manifested by the courts) and in women (manifested
by the wives seeking compensation).
These emotive
identifications, in turn, lead back to attitudes about the nature of
matrimony, the more overt "policy" question put forth in Hoak.
And these prompt reflections on the varying expectations of men
and women, and the dialectic of power manifest in marriage
relationships. 8
38. Ironically, the argument that "characterizing spousal contributions as
an investment in each other as human assets demeans the concept of
marriage," Hoak, 370 S.E.2d at 476, mirrors a line of argument employed for
not enforcing implied or express contractual claims to property in the context
of unmarried cohabitation.
"The argument here is essentially that even if such agreements use
language of promise, or commitment, or reciprocal obligation, that
language must be understood, in the intimate context in which it is
employed, as not involving any understanding that one party might use
a court to enforce a duty forsaken, or a promise broken."
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE. L.
REV. 997, 1100-01 (1985) (emphasis in original). As this attitude is further
broken down in the context of the cohabitation cases, other images emerge:
One powerful pair of contradictory images of woman paints the female
cohabitant as either an angel or a whore. As angel, she ministers to her
male partner out of noble emotions of love and self-sacrifice, with no
thought of personal gain. It would demean both her services and the
spirit in which they were offered to imagine that she expected a
return-it would make her a servant. As whore, she lures the man into
extravagant promises with the bait of her sexuality-and is
appropriately punished for her immorality when the court declines to
hold her partner to her agreement.
Id. at 1110-11.
Given Freud's account of the male need to debase the object of his sexual
desire in order to contain Oedipal frustration, the unconsciously appropriated
ambivalence of male judges toward women in unmarried relationships might
be felt more acutely when judges assess claims by married women: because
wife is identified with mother, the mother representative becomes a whore if
her sacrifices to her husband's medical or law degree are compensated with
money.
The breakdown of the protective measure by which the
mother/prostitute distinction is maintained (i.e., the man's debasement of
objects of sexual desire) results in impotence. See Sigmund Freud, A Special
Type of Choice of Object Made by Men, in THE FREUD READER 387-94 (Peter
Gay ed. 1989); Sigmund Freud, On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in
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Because the questions go to the truer motives of the judicial
authors and of the wider authorial community on whose behalf the
judges write, there are no definitive answers. Speculation is
constrained only by what the practical intellect sees as plausible.
What began as a simple study of effective metaphors has become
an exercise in philosophical psychology, appealing to different
modes
(e.g.,
psychoanalytic,
economic,
sociological)
of
understanding motivation. However open-ended this manner of
analysis, the speculation is directed to the attitudes of real
humans, rather than to an imaginary point where legal principles
meet at a level of abstraction high enough to explain
fundamentally different results as those principles are applied in
particular instances. This is discourse in real languages, not in
stare dictus. Real language speaks in many voices-narrative,
poetic, philosophical-and seeks a vital balance of emotion and
reason, as opposed to a vacuous dispassion of successive headnote
phrases.
Any decision-maker who takes seriously the
consequences of his decision will listen to the voices of those whose
lives are most burdened under its weight.
There is another very real benefit to this approach. For
purposes of the predictive analysis, it matters not whether the
process uncovers the truer motives of the judges, so long as it
uncovers attitudes that are likely those of the community of whom
a particular judge is a member, and to whom that judge will
speak. The verity of the attitudes is measured against the
analyst's own convictions about the issues and about public
perceptions, as the analyst's convictions are uncovered in the
interplay of questions set in motion by the judicial texts.
Predictive legal analysis is in this sense a means of selfknowledge. At this stage, the skills imparted by the study of the
rhetorical devices have extended beyond the scope of rhetoric.
Once the metaphors begin to be unpacked, the character of the
heuristic enterprise changes from rhetoric to something else.
Whether this "something else" is properly designated as
philosophy depends, of course, on how one views philosophy.
Taking a clue from William James, we might at least acknowledge
that it feels very much like philosophy. Philosophy, even when it
is done badly, is not content dispassionately to predict outcomes.
Philosophy lives in continuing conversation, and it aspires to
justice. That is an essential part of the feeling.
The philosophical enterprise that engages us in legal analysis
is more than an attempt to keep our modes of inference in proper
alignment, though it is not less. Enthymemes live in the human
mind, and the logic of enthymematic interpretation entails a kind
of philosophical psychology. Truth is always dependent upon

the Sphere of Love, in THE FREUD READER, at 394-400.
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context, and context is the stuff of psychology. What we discover
is that often contexts will shift to compensate for improper
inference, with salutary effect. Consider, for example, Professor
Brewer's hypothetical of the two bakers stuck with the precedent
of Joyner v. Adams, in which the North Carolina Court of Appeals
inaccurately deduces the rule of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts.39 The logic of the faulty rule precludes B, the young and
inexperienced baker, from prevailing if he had reason to know that
a "baker's dozen" consists of thirteen (regardless of the fact that A,
the old and experienced baker) actually knew that B thought he
was contracting for twelve. In applying the faulty rule, however, a
judge or jury could easily find that B did not have reason to know.
Although such a finding seems strained from our dispassionate
perspective, judges and jurors do not find their facts in an emotive
vacuum, and, given the perception of A's unfair advantage, B's
culpable lack of professional savvy could appear less consequential
in comparison. Logically, comparison has nothing to do with it
(i.e., B's "reason to know" does not increase or diminish as a
consequence of A's actual knowledge). Nevertheless, the logic of
the misstated rule does not preclude additional propositions
(especially silent ones) or ensure their logical integrity. If the
misstated rule of law does not allow for degrees of innocence,
human perceptions reflexively account for degrees within the
constraints of the rule.4 ° This is not a justification for bad
deduction. It is simply an acknowledgment that the Legal Realists
had a point. What courts say is never as important as what courts
do.
C. The Curriculum of Literary Criticism
Legal Realism forced the recognition that every legal decision
is simultaneously an ethical decision. Although the observation
might appear unremarkable on its face, it is a truth continually
obscured by the language in which law is written, a language that
emphasizes the general principle over and against individual
39

Scott Brewer, On the Possibilityof Necessity in Legal Argument: A

Dilemma for Holmes and Dewey 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 9 (2000).

40. This phenomenon is manifest in adverse possession cases. The
prevailing black letter rule is clear that for purposes of the "hostile" element,
an adverse possessor's state of mind is irrelevant. Nevertheless, as Professor
Helmholz has argued, it is most often the good faith possessors (or those who
are distinctly more deserving of sympathy than the true owners) who win. R.
H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331,

357 (1983). See also Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possessionand Subjective
Intent: A Reply to Professor Helmholz, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 58-64 (1986)
(challenging Helmholz's theory); R. H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A
Response to ProfessorCunningham, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 65, 99-106 (1986); Roger
A. Cunningham, More on Adverse Possession: A Rejoinder to Professor
Helmholz, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1167, 1183-85 (1986).
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distinctions and nuances in the circumstances of each case. Legal
language thus maintains a comparatively high level of abstraction,
and connotes a scientific method. Indeed, the "skills" traditionally
taught in Legal Writing courses reinforce the abstract character of
the language by emphasizing formulaic modes of "problem solving"
and rhetorical modes of "advocacy," disregarding ethical criticism
as irrelevant to the analytic enterprise. The dialect of stare dictus
is insidiously obscure, and this is true even if it is written in plain
English, without nominalizations, in sentences that avoid multiple
subordinate clauses and the passive voice. Insofar as we who
teach Legal Writing have defined our task of promoting clarity
only at the level of word choice and sentence structure, we have
unwittingly made a bad situation worse: we have taught writers to
obfuscate ethics with style."1
The mechanistic jurisprudence of Legal Formalism obfuscates
because it removes attention from the particular persons and
relationships as they live in an actual context, minimizing their
ethical relevance by focusing the meaning of a legal decision either
at a higher level of abstraction or at a deeper level of signification
(depending on which metaphor one prefers). To the formalist, the
objective quality of the rule of law depends upon the proper
translation of a human conflict into legal concepts which then
determine judgments as a matter of formal relations within a
larger system of concepts, all represented, however imperfectly, in
human language.4" The concepts logically precede particular
persons, relations, events, and emotions, all of which exist to fit
41. See generally Douglas Litowitz, Legal Writing: Its Nature, Limits, and
Dangers, 49 MERCER L. REV. 709 (1998). Rejecting the assertion that legal

language is "artificial" in the sense of being meaningless, Professor Litowitz
explains how legal concepts properly function to express specialized
relationships that would be expressed less efficiently in "plain" speech. Id. at
716-23. He proceeds to elucidate how legal concepts improperly function to (1)
obscure and mystify power relations, (2) narrow permissible ranges of thought
and emotion, (3) elevate formal rationality to irrational extremes, and (4)
create a privileged class of experts. Id. at 723-38. These improper functions
are not the result of a technical language per se, but of an unreflective
adherence to terms and categories without regard to a human context. Id.
Plain language too can obfuscate by concealing complexities.

Ironically, a

Legal Writing curriculum focused on promoting "plain" language will miss the
point, and even undermine the ethical concerns that first compelled the
movement to reform "legalese."
42. See generally, Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They
Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1426-32 (1995) (contrasting the "pure" style

of judicial writing characteristic of a "formalist" judicial posture with the
"impure" style characteristic of the judicial "pragmatist.") The pure style is
exemplified by Cardozo, Brandeis, Frankfurter, Brennan, and Harlan.

The

impure style is exemplified by Holmes, Douglas, Black, Jackson, and Hand.
"The pure style is an anodyne for thought. The impure style forces-well,
invites-the writer to dig below the verbal surface of the doctrines that he is
interpreting and applying." Id. at 1447.
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the conceptual categories. The dialect of stare dictus, as I have
used the term, results from the inability of language adequately to
signify the pure forms of law. Think of it as a kind of creole
mixing symbolic logic with the ordinary speech of"Lawyerland."3
There is another way of looking at the formal structure of law.
If the Legal Formalist's laws derive from something like Platonic
forms, the Legal Realist's laws derive from Wittgenstein's "forms
Concepts do not logically precede the people and
of life."
particulars that comprise them, but rather, concepts are
themselves inseparable from the particulars, just as words are
inseparable from their meanings rooted in other words. For
Wittgenstein, a word did not mean something because it
represented a higher or deeper something else. A word could
mean something only because it stood in a context of relationships
to other words standing around it. Human actions-the stuff that
law regulates-mean in the same way, by existing in a social
context, by participating in "forms of life" that give definition to
what we do and to who we are. A form of life, as opposed to the
neo-Platonic kind of form, cannot be accounted for in an artificial
language, just as the most humanly significant aspects of human
existence could not be gathered into the pedantic measures of
Learned Latin.
So there can be another kind of formalism. If by "formalism"
we mean a critical approach to law that assesses value against a
life-giving structural principle-a form-as it is manifested well or
poorly in specific acts of law-giving, Realists are also formalists;
they just appeal to a different kind of form. Here it is useful to
distinguish between the kind of "scientific formalism" traditionally
employed in jurisprudence and an "aesthetic formalism" employed
Scientific formalism rests on a
in literary criticism.45
43. See generally LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND: WHAT LAWYERS TALK
ABOUT WHEN THEY TALK ABOUT LAW (1997) (gritty, slice of life vignettes
portrayed in conversations between practicing attorneys).
44. "[To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life." LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 8e para. 19 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans. 1953). See NEWTON GARVER, THIS COMPLICATED FORM OF
LIFE 237-67 (1994) for a critique of philosophical interpretations of
Wittgenstein's use of the phrase in various passages.
45. For a fuller delineation of this distinction, including a comparison
between the New Critical formalism and that of the neo-Aristotelian "Chicago

School" of literary criticism, represented by Ronald Crane, see Jeffrey Malkan,
Literary Formalism, Legal Formalism, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1423-36
(1998). Professor Malkan further distinguishes a classical version of aesthetic
formalism exemplified in law by the "plain meaning" school of statutory
interpretation from a pragmatic version of aesthetic formalism. Id. The
classical version insists on a single meaning of a text, while the pragmatic
version "in principle, tolerates indeterminacy, but tries to control the
proliferation of meanings ... by establishing interpretive standards and
protocol, and by recognizing the authority of institutions and interpretive
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correspondence theory of meaning, seeing truth manifest to the
degree that a word or text conforms to a meaning at another level
of thought. Aesthetic formalism, by contrast, seeks meaning solely
within a text, seeing truth manifest to the degree that a literary
work itself reveals a unifying principle or scheme. This approach
to literature was characteristic of the New Critics. A similar
approach to jurisprudence was characteristic of the best of the
Legal Realists.
When Felix Cohen spoke of the proper understanding of stare
decisis as a consistency of ethical sensibility (the metaphorical
"quality of dough" giving shape to law over generations),46 he was
speaking of something like "forms of life" in Wittgenstein's sense.
Cohen did not contend that ethical decisions were made in a
logical vacuum or that bad logic was without ethical consequence,
but rather that logical inference was not the primary locus of
ethical content. In a similar vein, when Justice Holmes asserted
that "[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases,"47 he
recognized that the game of life is not like the game of chess. In
acting on one cherished moral principle, one will most often be
acting against another cherished principle. Without a metaprinciple, one acts on faith. And since meta-principles tend to be
extremely general, they cannot dictate action in specific cases
unless one supplies so many minor premises that one cannot really
escape acting on faith (instinct, intuition, emotion, or some
designation of a non-logical process) even with a meta-principle in
place. The ethical value of a judicial decision is apparent not
because the legal principles a court invokes are, at a higher level
of abstraction, systematically reconciled to other principles of
other cases, but because the fit of principle to circumstance is
psychologically compelling in the specific case.
Certainly, there are logical constraints set by prior cases
inasmuch as fairness in the wider context demands an evenhanded treatment of people with similar grievances, and inasmuch
as any decision must be justified in terms of fairness that are
commonly understood. But even this quasi-logic of fairness is at
times obscure if we attempt to articulate a meta-principle to which
the applied principles correspond to produce the fair result. Most
often, we have conviction that a decision is fair because it feels
fair. In all manner of life's decisions, when principles seem to
work, no meta-principle seems to make it happen.
One
explanation is that people are not reflective enough to recognize
the logical integrity of their own thought. Another explanation is
that our perception prioritizes the particular over the universal
communities to limit the free-play of signification." Id. at 1439.
46. Felix S. Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201,

216 (1931).
47. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
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because universals are inseparable from the particular forms that
give them life, and viewing the particular as existing for the sake
of the universal would miscast us to ourselves in our own drama.
The forms we seek to define us are necessarily drawn from the
stuff of the moment in which we find ourselves. Our sense of self,
other, and world, our "center of narrative gravity' 8 which makes
our identity, is more an aesthetic phenomenon than a logical one.
That is just the kind of creature we are.
Hence, unpacking the ethical content of a legal decision is
essentially examining why the enthymemes employed by the
decision-maker seem compelling (or not), and this examination is
essentially a study in the psychological power of the words that
provoke the reader to identify compelling relationships between
a more psychoanalytic mode---compelling
terms, or-in
associations of images. It is the psychological complex revealed by
this study in word power, rather than the inferential relationships
of principle, that forms the essence of stare decisis. Formal logic
can be a valuable tool insofar as it provides a baseline against
which word power can be measured for validity, but in many
instances something more than logical validity is required to make
a legal principle fit a situation. This is the aesthetic aspect of the
form that defines the legal decision as a legal decision. To the
extent that a judicial opinion is considered from this aesthetic
angle, it is an artistic work as much as is a poem or a story. In the
paradigm of New Critical study, the legal text is an object whose
purpose is implicit in its form. 49 The purpose of the text, the form
of life that it aspires to manifest, is justice.5"
The new literacy to which the Legal Writing curriculum must
aspire is no more radical in design than the model of freshman
composition many of us experienced as college students: an
introduction to rhetorical forms as a preparation for a thematic
study of literature. I do not advocate that we stop teaching
48. I have taken this phrase from DANIEL DENNETr,
EXPLAINED 418 (1991).

CONSCIOUSNESS

49. Judge Posner identifies the New Critics' reaction against nineteenthcentury Romantic poetry with certain contemporary judges' reaction against
the "pure" formalistic style of judicial opinions. Posner, supra note 42, at
While noting such New Critical concepts of irony, paradox,
1428-29.
complexity, polysemy, and ambiguity as illustrative principles of poetic form,
Posner does not suggest explicit formal criteria for judicial opinions
corresponding to the New Critics' criteria for poetry. Id. Nevertheless, by
connecting the New Critics with contemporary legal pragmatists, Posner, and
Malkan, implicitly raise the possibility and inspire the imagination.

50. The term is a loaded one, but no other will do. "Justice" as a formal
literary-interpretive principle is a kind of short-hand designation for the
convergence of various elements (rhetorical, psychological, emotional, ethical)

measurable in isolation, but ineffable in sum, generating a kind of intuitive
harmony that resists definition in empirically verifiable terms-hence "beyond
paraphrase."
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students how to write objective memoranda and appellate briefs.
Quite to the contrary, the "strong" rhetorical approach I have
outlined should function to make students highly conscious of the
persuasive character of all legal prose, and the significant
manipulative potential of ostensibly minor devices. And there
should be more, not less, devotion to the elementary principles of
logic. But this is not enough. "Style itself makes its claims,"
writes Martha Nussbaum, "expresses its own sense of what
matters. Literary form is not separable from philosophical
content, but is, itself, a part of content-an integral part, then, of
the search for and the statement of truth."51
In a word, it has been the false isolation of form and content,
style and truth, that has made law seem like a foreign language to
those of us who teach it no less than to those we teach. It is time
to speak in a vernacular tongue, even at the expense of admitting
that our words are not always capable of defining our terms, but
only of pointing to phenomena which definitions cannot contain.
For all that can be measured by the practical intellect and put into
words, there remains something that cannot be said about why
justice has been manifest in a particular case, notwithstanding the
competing principles, ambiguous facts, and moral ambivalence
that pervades the best and worst of all human acts. Goodness is
always fragmentary to the human touch. Pure justice is never
realized. Yet justice is done despite this, and we can never exactly
say why any more than we can say exactly what a poem does.
Justice manifest is very like a poem.
Great is Justice;
Justice is not settled by legislators and laws .... it is in the soul,
It cannot be varied by statutes any more than love or pride or the
attraction of gravity can,
It is immutable .. it does not depend on majorities .... majorities

or what not come at last before the same passionless and exact
tribunal.
For justice are the grand natural lawyers and perfect judges .... it
is in their souls,

It is well assorted

.... they have not studied for nothing ....
great include the less,

the

They rule on the highest grounds .... they oversee all eras and
states and administrations,
The perfect judge fears nothing .... he could go front to front
before God,

Before the perfect judge all shall stand back .... life and death shall

51. Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction: Form and Content, Philosophy and
Literature, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 3, 3 (1990).
See also MARTHA C.

NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE 99-118 (1995) (applying the principle in literary
critiques of three judicial opinions: Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984);
Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th

Cir. 1994); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).

20001

Languages of a Divided Kingdom
stand back ....

heaven and hell shall stand back.52

If the literary meaning of a work is that which cannot be
exhausted in paraphrase, justice is the judicial opinion's literary
meaning. But how does one teach students to apprehend a
meaning beyond the words of a legal text? One simply remembers
that one is teaching literature. Certainly the task is complicated
by the component of deductive reasoning, which comprises a
subtext to be studied for its own formal integrity. Moreover, legal
texts, unlike poems or fictional narratives, invariably contain
empirically verifiable references that must be scrutinized as part
of any formal analysis. Logical validity means nothing if it is
based on wrong premises. Legal literature in general, and the
judicial opinion in particular, always contain propositions. Yet the
judicial opinion, like other works of art, cannot be reduced to
propositions, and this is why Legal Writing courses, if they are to
be taught well, must contain a strong element of literary criticism.
A felicitous consequence is that it actually makes the subject
interesting.
Literature is interesting not because it expresses human
truths in propositions, but because inherent in a literary mode of
expression is a dimension that propositions cannot account for.
Literary criticism is interesting not because it provides a
monolithic mode of understanding this extra-propositional
dimension, but because it challenges us to test our purported
understandings against other possibilities. If, as T. S. Eliot
claimed, the task of the literary critic is to correct taste, a doggedly
ineffable and idiosyncratic aspect to aesthetic sensibility
guarantees that the enterprise will remain open-ended, just as it
dictates the necessity of criticism. It is precisely because we must
make judgments about good and bad literature that we must learn
to be critics. It is precisely because we must make judgments
about good and bad law that we must learn to be logicians and
rhetoricians. It is precisely because we presuppose goodness and
badness in all manner of judgments that we must learn to be
philosophers. As teachers, the most accomplished skill we can
impart is not a technical knowledge, but a mode of perception.
The distinguishing characteristic of the philosopher, it must be
remembered, is not undifferentiated wisdom, but the love that is
wisdom's catalyst.
"Great is goodness;
I do not know what it is anyr more than I know what health is ....
but I know it is great."5

52. Walt Whitman, Great Are the Myths [4] lines 50-58, in LEAVES OF
GRASS 144-45 (Penguin Books 1986) (1855).
53. Id. at 145 [5] lines 58-60.
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Sometimes definitions are rather beside the point.
CONCLUSION

The traditional Legal Writing curriculum has been largely
ineffective in teaching essential skills of the practical intellectthe deductive skills that measure the validity of arguments, and
the psychological skills that identify premises as emotionally
compelling and morally good. Much of this failure is a proximate
result of classic legal formalism, which promotes an artificial
language connoting a scientific method in legal discourse.
Traditional Legal Writing courses have accepted the formalist
structure uncritically, addressing only its infelicitous symptoms
through admonitions to "plain language." In fact, first-year
students continue to experience law as a foreign language even
when they successfully translate documents into simple
declarative sentences. A new approach is required if law is to be
experienced as a vernacular language, and only in a vernacular
context can students feel empowered to criticize the logical
integrity and moral suppositions of legal decisions. A vernacular
experience entails an interdisciplinary approach to legal analysis,
with "writing" acknowledged both as the pivotal assertive act that
makes law and as the creative mechanism by which law is
critiqued and contained. A vernacular model of teaching Legal
Writing can take different approaches, but modern literary
criticism, particularly in the mode of the New Criticism, provides
promising possibilities. Possibility is ours to cultivate. If we fail
in imagination, the fault is ours. If we succeed, we are progenitors
of a vital new literature and criticism, facilitating a more
functional unity of logic and emotion in our language, our selves,
and our laws. Perhaps the effect will be revolutionary; it will
certainly be salutary. If a new vernacular cannot unite a divided
kingdom, it can at least make it easier to speak across the divide.

